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Glossary of Abbreviations Used ~~in this report~~

(Initials are those proper to the original
Spanish language titles.)

AFG - Guatemalan Women's Alliance
AJDG - Democratic Youth Alliance of Guatemala
CGTG - General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers
CNCG - National Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants
CPUSA - Communist Party of the United States
CTAL - Confederation of Workers of Latin America
PAR - Revolutionary Action Party
PCG - Communist Party of Guatemala
PGT - Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist)
PRG - Party of the Guatemalan Revolution
PROG - Workers Revolutionary Party of Guatemala
RN - Party of National Reconstruction
STEG - Union of Guatemalan Educational Workers
WFTU - World Federation of Trade Unions

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INTRODUCTION

domination of Guatemala by the Communist Party
In 1954 the ~~Communist Party of Guatemala's domination of the~~ nation was crushed by an armed uprising. ~~Violent action was made necessary by the successes which the Communist Party had achieved~~ *wiping out* in infiltrating key government positions and in establishing control over powerful mass organizations.

The existence of This paper is a description of the techniques the Communists used to achieve these successes. Important as the techniques were, it is essential to realize that the fundamental strategy adopted by the Communists was exploitation of the cause of nationalism, ^{or} the widespread desire for social, agrarian and labor reform, and ^{or} the good faith of a people unfamiliar with the nature of Communism. ^{or} These factors created an excellent environment for the use of the techniques which the Communists developed.

Much of the Communist success was attributable also to the friendly attitudes of the two post-revolutionary presidents. The political philosophy of the first, President AREVALO, was basically parallel to Marxism; his successor, President ARBENZ, was strongly motivated by an opportunism and a rabid nationalism which caused him to collaborate with the Communists whom he recognized as an ambitious, astute group which was in the ascendency. The Communists took full advantage of these favorable presidential attitudes.

To understand the extent of Communist infiltration of key government offices and the political dominance Communists had achieved by early 1954 in Guatemala, it is essential to know that from the beginning of their campaign in 1944, they exploited the cause of "nationalism" and successfully identified Communist goals with social and labor action undertaken as part of the entire national reform movement. Communists eagerly seized the leadership of all mass movements, sponsoring national reforms.

Open political activity after the fall of the dictatorship in 1944 was possible (at first) to Communists only as they worked as individuals from within other left-wing political groups. In this way, they obtained many opening wedges in legislative and executive branches of the government. Legislative areas upon which they particularly concentrated were labor, agrarian and electoral reform measures. Executive units in which Communists were especially interested were those responsible for social welfare, agrarian affairs, communication and propaganda, and education.

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The friendly attitude of President ARBENZ, who was strongly influenced by the two most prominent Communist leaders, finally made possible the legalization of the Communist Party which had been founded in September 1947. Transformation of the Communist-dominated Democratic Electoral Front of political parties and labor unions, supporting Arbenz, into a permanent political organ, whose Council, through Communist contrivance, supplanted the Guatemalan Cabinet as a policy-making body, brought Communists to the peak of power in 1953-1954. Finally, opposition to Communist activity began to take cohesive force, and certain failures on the part of the Communists themselves—particularly their failure to achieve control of the Army—led to their downfall in June 1954.

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I. THE BUILD-UP PERIOD

The Beginning of the Glitch. The political upheavals upon which the Communists in Guatemala began their rise to power were the revolutions of June and October 1944, which ended a 70-year period of dictatorships. This fluid situation was brought about by young intellectuals—students, young teachers and other people of the professions whose political philosophies were, in many cases, a peculiar mixture of nationalism and Marxism.

Inexperienced and untrained politically, they sought and received political guidance from left-wing Guatemalan intellectuals who had been living abroad during the last years of the dictatorships, and from foreign Communists. At this time there was no Communist Party, since the original Party founded in the 1920's had been wiped out in 1932. The Communists now had to organize a new Party and to find ways of achieving political influence which would lead to ultimate political dominance.

Advances Made During AREVALO Regime. The first post-revolutionary president, Dr. Juan Jose AREVALO, whose political philosophy appears to have come progressively closer to Marxism after his administration ended, permitted no open Communist organization (political party, indoctrination school) but did allow and encourage Communists to work in other left-wing political parties. AREVALO himself willingly co-operated with them as individuals in the political and labor groups which supported his administration.

In such a political atmosphere, it was logical for the Communists to work through several political media: (1) as members of other political parties participating in the AREVALO administration; (2) as organizers of mass movements sponsoring popular reform action; (3) as members of a secret Communist Party, led by Jose Manuel FORTUAY, which was finally to emerge as the dominant group apparently having Moscow's approval; and (4) as adherents of an open, Communist-line party designed by its founder, Victor Manuel OUTIERREZ, primarily as indoctrination center for future labor leaders.

Penetration and Exploitation of Other Left-Wing Parties: 1945 to End of AREVALO Administration. As previously stated, President AREVALO permitted and encouraged Communists as individuals to work in the non-Communist, left-wing political parties supporting his administration. As members of these, they were able to participate in national and local elections and to obtain prominent positions in the legislative and executive branches of the government. A brief survey of some of the Communists working in other political parties and groups shows how useful these were in achieving Communist infiltration of Congress during the build-up period:

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- March 1945 - Jose Manuel PORTUÑO was an active and far-leftist member of the Popular Front of Liberation, on whose ticket he was elected to Congress.
- January 1946 - Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ was elected deputy to the National Congress on Confederation of Guatemalan Workers—Party of Revolutionary Action (PAR) ticket, from the Department of Guatemala.
- 1947 - Manuel PINTO Unga was elected on ^{the} Party of Revolutionary Action—Committee of Syndical Unity ticket to ^{the} National Congress.
- November 1950 ^{the} Party of Revolutionary Action ticket of congressional candidates included at least six individuals of well-known Communist or pro-Communist views.

During the AREVALO regime, Professor Mardoqueo GARCIA Asturias was director of the Escuela Normal (Normal School). Although he was a member of PAR, he consistently acted as a Communist, and during his administration of the Normal School a strong communist movement was started in the school, and graduates of the school swelled the ranks of the Communist-dominated Democratic Youth Alliance of Guatemala (ADQ) and the youth sections of the various left-wing political parties of AREVALO's administration. At the end of 1950, through the efforts of GARCIA Asturias, a broadcasting station was set up which was used exclusively by the Normal School and its left-wing administrators. In early 1952, GARCIA Asturias was appointed Minister of Public Education. With this key post well within Communist grasp, the entire Ministry could be heavily infiltrated with Communists and Communist sympathizers.

Mass Movements: Their Use in Facilitating Communist Infiltration of Government. In Guatemala, as elsewhere, Communists attempted to reach every segment of society through a variety of Communist front organizations which were founded for women, youth, cultural groups, those interested in world peace, and so on. No matter what the specific activity of the club, propaganda to support Communist political objectives was soon injected into each of the front organizations' programs. Once Communist domination was assured - and particularly in the case of the labor groups - successful efforts were made to give these groups a voice in action taken by the National Front.

Prominent government officials of the AREVALO administration were the ostensible leaders of some of the fronts. The Communists had selected these men in order to give the fronts greater prestige. Probably an ulterior motive of Communist leaders who brought public officials into leadership of front groups was to win them over by making them dependent upon Communist support, and thus to create additional footholds in government agencies which would be of use for Communist infiltration.

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For example, soon after the World Congress of Intellectuals in August 1948 at Breslau, Poland, where a Committee to Defend the Peace was elected, and a program adopted to set up national branches, a peace committee was set up in Guatemala. Julio COMEZ Robles, who was then chief of the Guatemala Social Security Institute, was swept into the organization as its first president. The thorough infiltration of the Social Security Institute, which was ultimately achieved, was probably facilitated by the "softening-up" of non-Communist officials who were brought into the front organizations.

Labor Reform Movement. Prior to 1944, no labor unions other than controlled workmen's national aid societies had been permitted. From mid-1944 on, a great many trade unions were formed. In August 1945, the Confederation of Workers of Guatemala was founded as the first national labor organization. Communist labor leaders, former exiles, ⁶⁸ labor experts from neighboring countries, appeared on the local scene equipped with the necessary talent for labor organization work-- a talent lacking in most non-Communist reformists of the post-revolutionary period. A Moscow-trained Communist and other experienced Communist labor leaders from neighboring countries, established a labor training school where a group of workers, who were later to dominate the labor field, received instruction in Marxist principles. The PROCO also served as a training center for trade union activists.

Communists (of both the underground Party and the open Communist-line party, (PROCO) together with the labor unions under their influence, formed the National Political Committee of Workers (CNPT) to work in the 1950 presidential and congressional elections. The labor unions thus became politically significant, and were a source of strength contributing to Communist penetration of government. Communist-influenced labor movements in Guatemala included well over 100,000 members. The significance of this figure appears when one compares it with the total number of votes in the 1950 presidential election: 415,000.

subsequent Communist leadership of the labor movement in Guatemala paid generous returns during the following administration when, under ARBENZ, Communists were able to secure labor representation in the National Democratic Front, and thus the entire labor movement became a strong, coherent force with the right of political expression.

The Founding of an Underground Communist Party. This was reportedly established during a secret meeting held on 28 September 1947. Its leaders all appear to have been persons who were known publicly as officials of PAN and the labor unions. FORTUNE was formally elected Secretary General of this underground group in 1948.

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members
By June 1950 when election of a new government was imminent, the underground Communist Party emerged to the extent that it published a newspaper, Octubre, with the sub-heading: "For a Great Communist Party, vanguard of the Workers, the Peasants and the People." The group still did not openly profess themselves as the Communist Party, and was known as the "Octubre Communists." The outgoing AREVALO administration did not ban the paper, but it did dismiss those of the "Octubre Communist group" from government positions. In spite of their differences with the AREVALO government, these Communists collaborated with the parties supporting that government in the presidential campaign of Colonel ARBENZ, President AREVALO's chosen successor, and a candidate whom the Communists themselves appeared to favor greatly.

The Open, Communist-Line Party. The underground Communist Party and the Workers Revolutionary Party of Guatemala (PROG), provided the immediate direction for the organization and domination of popular reform movements, especially labor and agrarian, which were certain to lead to more extensive Communist representation in government office.

PROG, an open, Communist-line political party, had a short, specialized existence. As stated previously, GUTIERREZ conceived of his party as a school for the training of labor leaders who would guide a slowly developing labor movement. Therefore PROG's membership was necessarily selective. Following a visit to Moscow in January 1952, Gutierrez announced the dissolution of PROG, stated that he would join FORTUNE's PCG and advised his followers to do likewise.

Communist Infiltration of the Powerful National Electoral Board. The Electoral Law, as provided by the Guatemalan Constitution of 1945, was detailed with regard to rules and procedures for the formation, registration and functioning of political parties. Those legal provisions which seemed to encourage the free functioning of political parties in Guatemala were offset by the considerable power, particularly as it applied to the suspension and cancellation of party registrations, which the Electoral Law invested in the National Electoral Board.

In practice, the legal position of a party in Guatemala was determined largely by the National Electoral Board, a body comprised of three active and six alternate members. From its inception, it was controlled by the leftist parties. The only legal recourse of a party whose registration was suspended or cancelled was appeal to the Supreme Court, which was theoretically, but not actually, independent of the Executive.

In early 1950 one member of the National Electoral Board was Jose FORTUNE. Undoubtedly from this position he took whatever action possible to hinder the movements of conservative political groups and to promote the Communist cause. Later (as will be shown) the Board's membership was predominantly Communist-oriented.

II. COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF ARBENZ AND EXPLOITATION OF HIS ADMINISTRATION

to hold
The Communists considered ARBENZ a valuable asset. Their situation in Guatemala appears to have paralleled that of Communists in a West European country where the Party does not have a sufficient number of members capable of holding public positions even if available. Therefore, that Party reasons that it must get people "who are still not completely on our side but who will cooperate with us." If such people hold public office, the Party intends to put a party member behind them, since they are not yet reliable and convinced Communists. Possibly FORTUNY and GUTIERREZ were similarly responsible for the political indoctrination of ARBENZ.

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The incidents leading to the arrangement whereby FORTUNY became campaign manager for ARBENZ' presidential campaign are not entirely clear, but in any case FORTUNY assumed that role in the summer of 1950. As previously stated, one of the instruments which Communists brought in at this time to promote the campaign was the labor movement, which now was either Communist-controlled or strongly Communist-influenced.

Communist Influence over President ARBENZ. Of primary significance to the success which Communists enjoyed, during the ARBENZ administration, in putting their affiliates in key government positions, were the close personal relationships between ARBENZ and Communist leaders, Jose Manuel FORTUNY and Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ. A glimpse into the personal background of ARBENZ shows that, prior to the revolution of 1944, he had been a poverty-stricken and not-overly intelligent Army captain whose principal asset appeared to be an extremely shrewd and ambitious wife. Communist leaders apparently recognized ARBENZ as a weak personality who would be completely manageable in their hands.

Opportunism figured prominently in moving ARBENZ and his wife to cooperate with the Communists, and to accumulate as much in the way of liquid assets as they could during his tenure of office.

There is also a possibility that Communists may have been able to exercise some coercion over ARBENZ. According to a statement reportedly made by former President AREVALO, one prominent Guatemalan businessman could get whatever he wanted from ARBENZ because he was in a position to expose details of the murder of Colonel Francisco Xavier ARANA, Chief of the Armed Forces, in July 1949 in which ARBENZ was implicated.¹

1. The present Guatemalan government officially charged ARBENZ of with implication in ARANA's murder.

Possibly, Communist leaders could exercise a similar hold, although most available information shows the relationship between Party leaders and ARBENZ to be one of harmonious collaboration for purposes of achieving their respective aims. Many of ARBENZ' public speeches reportedly were written by either FORTUNEY or GUTIERREZ.

The ARBENZ Administration: Communist Exploitation of Progressively Favorable Climate. With the inauguration of President ARBENZ on 15 March 1951, the underground Communist Party headed by Jose FORTUNEY undertook final steps leading to legal existence. In April 1951, FORTUNEY signed a press statement as "Secretary General of the Communist Party of Guatemala (PCG), which was the first public admission of an organized Communist Party in Guatemala. In spite of the provisions of the 1946 Constitution and the Electoral Law which specifically forbade "political organizations of a foreign or international character," during 1952 the representatives of PCG were reported in the press as sitting in on President ARBENZ' political conferences along with those of other leftist parties of the administration.

Legalization of the Communist Party. In December 1952, PCG held its Second Party Congress and its name was changed to the Guatemala Labor Party (POT) to avoid popular resistance to the word "Communist," and to facilitate the legalization of the Party. On December 19, 1952, the POT was registered as a political party in the Civil Registry despite the protest of anti-Communist groups.

Unification of the Labor Movement Under Communist Leadership. This objective was obviously of primary interest, not only to indigenous Communist elements, but to Communist labor leaders, of international significance. Even the WFTU Secretary General, Louis SAILLANT, attended a labor conference in

Guatemala during this period when much discreet activity was being carried out for the achievement of "labor unity" under Communist control.

The Congress of Land and Air Transport Workers, held in Guatemala from 8 to 15 May 1951, provided opportunity for foreign Communist labor experts to assist with plans for the consolidation of all urban and rural workers of Guatemala into one body. At the closing session, Vicente LOMBARDI Toledano, Secretary of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CEAL), a regional organization of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), stated that the occasion was an important one because the Congress was closing "with all preparations completed for the unification of the farm and workers movements into a single central organization."

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In summary, the Communist exploitation of the labor reform movement in Guatemala was achieved by: (a) Communist preparations for and ability to seize labor leadership; (b) lack of effective non-Communist labor leaders; (c) absence of native labor union principles opposing Marxist labor theory and therefore the acceptance of the latter by many inexperienced and untrained labor organizers; (d) expert guidance from Communist labor leaders from abroad; and (e) Communist provision of labor training centers in Guatemala.

Incorporation of Labor Movement in the National Democratic Front

The entire labor movement became a principal tool for political pressure when, through Communist agitation, the two major labor confederations—one Communist-dominated and the other progressively becoming so—were formally incorporated into the National Democratic Front. The Front originally comprised the four political parties supporting the ARBENZ administration: the Party of Revolutionary Action (PAR), the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG), the Party of National Reconstruction (RN), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (POT), all of which were heavily infiltrated by the Communists. The Front Council, as will be explained, eventually assumed policy-making and advisory roles, working very closely with President ARBENZ.

Agrarian Reform. The introduction of the entire agrarian reform program was largely under Communist supervision. Jose FORTUNE was especially active in connection with the Agrarian Reform Bill. One report describes him as having spent two years studying agrarian reform laws of China, Russia and other countries, and as using some of these as material on which to base an agrarian reform law for Guatemala. FORTUNE subsequently took an active part in the proceedings of the Guatemalan Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, although he was neither a member of the Committee nor of Congress.

Prior to these Congressional deliberations, by decision of the POT Political Committee, agitators had been sent out into the country to conduct propaganda in favor of the draft law; these agitators were "appropriately informed" by means of courses which the Party had set up as preparation for the agrarian reform. The Special Committee on Agrarian Reform included three of the four POT deputies to Congress; one of them, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, was Committee chairman. Thus, adequate measures had been taken to assure Communist control over the program from its inception.

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The entire program as it was actually applied--largely under Communist guidance--was designed to put pressure on the peasantry (in order to get land they should support Communist programs); to demonstrate and to publicize Communist support of peasant interests; and to procure additional government positions for Communists.

The Agrarian Law set up as executive units the National Agrarian Department, the National Agrarian Council, Departmental Agrarian Commissions and local Agrarian Committees. The law assigned a certain portion of the seats on these various agrarian executive bodies to the Communist-dominated CUTG and the fellow-travelling ONOG. These labor groups were especially active among rural elements as the Agrarian Reform Bill was about to be presented to Congress. Subsequent to the enactment in June 1952, CUTG created a key role for itself by setting up an agency giving effective assistance to applicants for agrarian benefits. Thus, an outlet was provided for patronizing Communist supporters and publicizing the role of the Communists in land reform. Furthermore, at public ceremonies where distribution of lands was made, the Communists used every occasion to participate as speakers and to give publicity to their work in agrarian reform activities.

The Communists worked continually behind the scenes to place their members in executive units of the Agrarian Reform. They helped one another to obtain employment in key positions of the National Agrarian Department. In February 1954 they succeeded in having the leader of the Communist-front student organization, an employee of the Ministry of Economy, placed as the representative of that Ministry on the National Agrarian Council.

National Democratic Front. PGT then used its strength to enter and dominate, through "united front" tactics, the administration's "Democratic Electoral Front" which participated in the 1953 congressional elections. The Communists were successful in transforming the Democratic Electoral Front into a ~~democratic~~ National Democratic Front, the Council of which assumed policy-making functions which had once been the responsibility of the Cabinet. The National Democratic Front was an alliance of the parties and the industrial and farm labor groups supporting the ARBENZ administration: the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRO), the Party of National Reconstruction (RN), the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), the CUTG and ONOG. The labor groups (CUTG and ONOG) were included at Communist insistence,

since these groups constituted in themselves the strongest political forces in the country. The Front held 51 of 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress and virtually all Government jobs were filled with members of one or another of these parties.

^{such} Because of a positive Party ideology and program, and the lack of ~~these~~ on the part of the non-Communist parties in the Front, the Communists were able to achieve a position of dominance. The non-Communist Parties of the front developed political ideologies and programs which were for the most part imitations of the Communist Party. The ascendancy of Communist ideology and position in the Front was also effected by the successful penetration which the Communist Party had achieved in other parties of the Front. By successful "divide and rule" tactics, the FOT prevented the creation of a single non-Communist National Front party *free from* which the Communists could not control.

III. AREAS OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF ARBENZ GOVERNMENT

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An increasingly favorable political climate, ensuing Communist organizational tactics, and preparedness to take the lead in labor and social reform action, were factors mainly responsible for the thorough penetration of government offices which the Communists achieved by 1953. Protected by the tolerance of President ABEVALO and assisted by the favor of President ARBENZ, Communists infiltrated their members and sympathizers in key executive positions of the public administration, with special concentration on the agrarian reform machinery, the government information and propaganda agencies, the social security system and public education institutions.

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Presidential Advisors. During the ARBENZ administration, Communists were among those who made a great effort to maintain close relations with the President. The group of Presidential advisors, an informal group which has been termed "the kitchen cabinet", was more or less identical in composition with the Council of the National Democratic Front. Largely through Communist effort and manipulation, this group gradually replaced the Cabinet as a focal point for policy formulation.

Of the ten members of the Council who attended meetings in early 1954, four were FOT members, and of the remaining six, at least four were Communist sympathizers. Protests of the ARBENZ administration that its Cabinet contained not one Communist were therefore meaningless, since the Cabinet, through clever Communist maneuvering and unwavering Presidential support, no longer carried out its legitimate functions. Thus, the Arbenz administration, at the highest level, was dominated by FOT leaders.

The National Electoral Board. As previously stated, control over this body as it was set up by legislation of 1945 was exercised by left-wing parties which had brought about the Guatemala revolution. One of the pro-Communists of this board in 1951 was Jaime DIAZ Remijn, it was reportedly due to his maneuvering prior to the Congressional elections of 1 March 1952 that the Communists had obtained the presidency of three Congressional Committees: Revision of the Labor Code, Agrarian Reform, and Revision of Contracts between the Guatemala government and Foreign Companies. Two members of the National Electoral Board in 1953 were Communist intellectuals; one was president of the Communist-front, Causa Cultura.

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Congress. As previously stated, by the end of 1953 the National Democratic Front, which the Communists were able to manipulate according to their own interests, held 51 of 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress. The FDT itself (as of mid-1954) had only four official representatives in the unicameral Congress, but these four held key positions: Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ was First Secretary of Congress and Chairman of Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform; Jose Alberto CARDOZA was chairman of the Special Committee on Revision of the Labor Code during the 1953-54 sessions; Carlos Manuel PELLEGER was the most vociferous administration supporter and organizer on the floor.

Besides the FDT's known representatives, however, at least a dozen more deputies were Communist sympathizers or possibly secret Party members. An expression of good wishes to the Third World Youth Festival, published on 23 August 1951 in Diario de Centro America, official publication of the Guatemalan government, was signed by eleven deputies to the Guatemalan Congress. One excellent illustration of Communist infiltration of Congress is exemplified by Major Marcos Antonio FRANCO Chacon, Communist sympathizer prominent in "peace" activities, who traveled to the World Peace Council meeting in Budapest, Hungary in June 1953, and who was elected President of Congress for the 1954-1955 session.

Agrarian Affairs. Despite the fact that very few names of FDT members were ever made public, a significant number of the employees of the National Agrarian Department (Departamento Agrario Nacional) appeared among them. The Department was headed by Major Alfonso MARTINEZ Estrella, an opportunistic non-Communist who was President Arana's private secretary until July 1, 1952; however, Waldemar BARRIOS Klee, the head of the Lands Section, who acted as Chief when Major MARTINEZ was absent, was a FDT member. The Secretary General of the National Agrarian Department, through whom all documents were channelled, was the wife of Jose FORTUNE.

Of the twenty agrarian inspectors of the National Agrarian Department, at least fifteen were reportedly either Communists or Communist sympathizers. Another dozen of the Department's employees were known Party members. A Guatemalan newspaper, the independent El Espectador of September 9, 1953, made the charge that "85 percent" of all departmental employees adhered to the FDT. This statement was possibly an exaggeration, but nevertheless indicative of the Communist coloration of that Department.

The influence of the PUT over the agrarian reform was further facilitated by the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, as amended. In addition to the National Agrarian Department, the law established local Agrarian Committees which passed in the first instance on petitions for the expropriation and distribution of land; departmental Agrarian Commissions, which were the first reviewing authority; and a National Agrarian Council, which was the final court of appeal under the President. The law, as amended, provided that specific percentages of all these bodies should be representatives of the trade union confederations, COTU or CHCO. For example, 60% of the local Agrarian Committees were to be representatives of COTU or CHCO. Since the COTU was definitely Communist controlled, and the CHCO was progressively coming under Communist domination, the PUT had forceful tools for directing the course and pace of agrarian reform action.

The Institute of Social Security. Some eighteen functionaries of this agency were either Communists or sympathizers, including its director, Alfonso SOLIMZANS. Actually, the Institute of Social Security was a stronghold of "non-party" Communists who supported the PUT program but were not always organizationally at peace with Jose FORTUNEY'S dominant clique in the PUT.

Ministry of Communications and Government Publication Offices. In 1951, Carlos ALVARADO Jerez, an avowed Communist, was appointed Director General of Radio Broadcasting and director of the national radio station, "TEN". In early 1951, a well-known Honduran Communist, Medardo MEJIA, was still on the staff of the Government's official gazette. Paul LEIVA, a faithful propagandist for Communism, remained in the President's Office for Publicity and Propaganda. Throughout the ARENAL administration, the government's official newspaper, the Diario de Centro America, had a consistent pro-Communist slant.

Ministry of Public Education. In 1952 Edelberto TIERES, a Nicaraguan Communist, headed the Editorial Office, Ministry of Education, and taught in the University of San Carlos, the national university.

A principal instrument for Communist infiltration of the educational system was the Communist-dominated Union of Guatemalan Educational Workers (STEG); its Secretary General was Rafael TISCHLER, a registered PUT member, who visited the Soviet Union in 1951. STEG wielded considerable power in the Escuela Normal Central de Varadero, and the new teachers graduated from this school were mostly Communists, due to the influence of the faculty.

As many of the Communist graduates as possible were placed in Guatemala City schools and in the better rural schools. All government teachers were required to belong to STEG.

Other Government Departments. In the Ministry of Economy and Labor, the Under Secretary, Isidoro ANZURES, a PRT member and strong supporter of Communist-front activities, figured prominently in the Communist-organized National Conference in Defense of the Rights of Youth in February 1953. Hugo BARRIOS Klee, a PRT member, was Deputy Inspector General of Labor in this Ministry. Humberto PINEDA, Labor Inspector in the Department of Santa Rosa, was reportedly a PRT member.

In the Guatemalan Postal Service, mail addressed to the PRT reportedly was handled separately and, by prior arrangement with postal authorities, was not subject to censorship. Correspondence addressed to "reactionary groups" in Guatemala was censored and the contents delivered to the PRT when of interest. Thus, through its infiltration of the postal service, the PRT obtained a considerable amount of information about the plans of anti-Communist groups, their organizations, and foreign contacts.

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IV. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION ACHIEVEMENTS
AND THE REACTION OF THE OPPOSITION

by In summary, the FGT built up effective means of infiltrating key government positions by exploiting a fluid, revolutionary situation, and, playing upon the theme of nationalism, skillfully presenting Communist aims as identical with those of Guatemalan national aspirations. This was followed by concrete steps to achieve political power by working (a) from within non-Communist but left-wing political parties; (b) from an underground Communist Party; (c) from a Communist-line political party; and (d) from leadership positions of the mass movements--especially the labor reform movement--which became strong political forces. Of particular value also for increasing Communist strength and permitting subsequent infiltration of government office, on both the local and the national levels, was the agrarian reform movement, which was largely under Communist leadership. By energetic Communist action from within all these bodies, Communists succeeded in placing secret Party members and fellow travelers in key legislative and executive positions of the AREVALO administration. Concentrated effort appears to have been made to attain positions which could be used to manipulate the electoral laws, and to enact labor and agrarian reform measures.

With a strongly pro-Communist candidate stepping into the office of the Presidency in early 1951, the entire Communist organization step-by-step came into the open, was unified and legalized. The close personal relationship between ARBENZ and the two most prominent Communist Party leaders was a most significant factor in permitting ever increasing infiltration of government agencies and exercise of Communist influence from the office of the Presidency down through the executive and legislative units.

The emergence of an open, legal Communist Party and the progressively greater power it steadily manifested under President ARBENZ caused a polarization of opposition among anti-Communist professional, business, military, university and Catholic groups, even though some--especially professional and business people--had welcomed the end of the dictatorships and had acquiesced in early phases of the revolution's social reforms. Eventually they objected to the extremist groups (Communists and pro-Communists) which held the reins of government control.

Failure on the part of the Communists themselves to control the national Army and to develop adequate "self-defense" committees (Party controlled military forces), as well as their undue reliance upon presidential favor, also contributed to their downfall. Belated and inadequate efforts

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were made to arm the peasants and workers affiliated with CNDQ and COTU and to organize armed units comprising members of the pro-ARREZ coalition parties forming the National Front. Instructions were issued that members of these units had to be of "absolute revolutionary security".

On 27 June 1954, ARREZ and his Communist-oriented regime fell from power. ¹⁰Communists and pro-Communists fled into political asylum or went underground with the Communist Party (Guatemalan Labor Party) which was declared illegal.

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